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  1I. Introduction 
Broadly defined as the rules of the game, the notion of institutions in economics and 
politology captures the idea that the game of economics or politics is the same all over 
the world but neither the rules nor the enforcement of those rules are necessarily 
identical (North, 1991). Starting in the mid-80’s a substantial literature has 
demonstrated how both formal and informal institutions affect outcomes such as 
economic growth (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Kaufmann 
and Kraay, 2002; Zak and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004), aggregate 
productivity (Hall and Jones, 1999; Méon and Weill, 2005), corruption (Treisman, 
2000; Uslaner, 2002), and subjective life satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; 
Bjørnskov, 2003; Helliwell, 2003) as well as securing the gains from trade (Anderson 
and Marcouiller, 2002; de Groot et al., 2004). An important question is therefore what 
causes the considerable cross-country variation in the quality of institutions and 
governance, a question that has also generated substantial results by showing how 
cultural features and economic development affects institutional development (la Porta 
et al., 1997; Rice and Sumberg, 1997; Paldam, 2001; Knack, 2002; Knack and Zak, 
2002).  
A subset of the potential determinants contains various political factors that 
affect institutional quality. However, with very few exceptions all studies on this subset 
have been confined to comparing outcomes across states in federal nations. As such, 
most studies have explored the variation between US states and although the arguments 
for the absence of political effects are good, many studies find consequences of political 
ideology. Berry et al. (1998) review part of this literature and replicate two results from 
previous papers on cross-state US data of interest to the present study, showing that 
welfare spending and tax progressivity are influenced by the political ideology of the 
state government in power. Cross-country studies have instead focused on the 
differences between so-called social democrat, Christian democrat and liberal systems 
and found that the former intervene more in the economy (e.g. Huber and Stephens, 
2000). The few cross-country studies to date to examine the effects of political ideology 
per se indicates that countries with a propensity to elect rightwing governments grow 
faster by creating stronger legal systems and having less government involvement in the 
economy (Bjørnskov, 2005). While this paper thus replicates the well-known result 
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well as revisiting Nordhaus’ (1975) and Hibbs’ (1977) finding that ideology is 
associated with economic performance, it also provides tentative evidence that the 
quality of countries’ legal systems may be affected by political ideology. The present 
paper raises another question by recognizing the problem of interpreting the findings as 
effects of either citizens’ or governments’ political convictions.  
This paper elaborates on the connection between ideology and institutional 
quality by considering a set of cross-country indicators of economic freedom and 
addressing the potential problem of interpretation largely evaded by the literature. More 
specifically, the paper provides three main contributions. The impact of ideology on the 
size of government, legal quality, and regulation are addressed in turn, thereby drawing 
a more detailed picture of the association between political ideology and institutional 
quality. The paper also distinguishes between short-run fluctuations in the ideology of 
governments and long-term ideological convictions of citizens that more likely reveal a 
set of underlying social norms and beliefs of how society works. Finally, the paper 
outlines how the degree of political competition affects results and how different 
ideologies affect countries’ response to economic crisis.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews definitions and previous 
literature, leading up to section III that presents the cross-country measure of political 
ideology. Section IV presents the data and the empirical strategy employed in section V, 
which contains the empirical findings on each of the three components of economic 
freedom. Section VI discusses these findings and concludes.  
 
II. Definitions and previous literature  
Ideology is central to many topics in political science and the literature devoted to the 
subject is correspondingly voluminous. The concept of ideology is, however, hotly 
disputed and has proved to be difficult to define and consequently difficult to measure. 
This paper deals exclusively with political ideology – and all references to ideology are 
hence to the political component of it - yet even when making this restriction political 
science and economics contain a plethora of mutually conflicting definitions and views 
on what it is. Various studies have treated it as culture, positions defined by class 
interests, purely linguistic discourse, belief-systems and overall weltanschauung (e.g. 
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discussion of the concept, ultimately concluding with a definition of ideology in 
political science as “a logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less 
sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of 
one’s social condition – especially its prospects for the future – to a program of 
collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of society”. He thus 
emphasizes the necessary action-orientation of political ideology, i.e. that it does not 
cause “one to do but gives one cause for doing” (Mullins, 1972, 509). More recently, 
Gerring (1997) reviews the vast literature on political ideology and its definition – a 
disconcerting piece of reading as it shows how little progress has been made towards a 
definitional consensus in the 25 years between this and Mullins’ contribution. He 
concludes by stressing the need for internal coherence in any core definition of ideology 
and thereby tries to differentiate ideology from e.g. culture or belief-systems by arguing 
that a set of values “becomes ideological only insofar as it specifies a concrete program, 
a set of issue-positions” (Gerring, 1997, 975).  Hence, if a person has a specific position 
on one issue, he is likely to have specific predictable positions on other issues, 
depending on his political ideology.  
Requiring any measurable understanding of ideology to be coherent in 
Mullin’s sense that ideological positions and the policy prescriptions deriving thereof 
cannot contradict each other – i.e. that quantifiable ideological positions must correlate 
across issues - thus amounts to connecting political ideology to preferences for political 
action. Another implication is that the necessity for coherence invariably restricts the 
dimensionality of the concept. What is more, even if voters’ ideologies are 
multidimensional, their voting patterns are reduced to the dimensions of the ideological 
space spanned by the limited number of parties running for parliament, given that the 
term ‘political party’ makes sense by parties holding their candidates accountable within 
a broad party ideology. Political ideology is a potentially complex feature yet 
operationalizing it as a unidimensional construct measurable in a left-to-right scheme 
hence need not necessarily entail any sizeable loss of information or sophistication 
when connected to real political outcomes. An important assumption in the following is 
therefore that a reduction of political ideology to a simple left-to-right scheme makes 
sense, as it is crucial to the validity of the indicator developed below. Although 
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large-scale work has documented that very little information is indeed lost when 
restricting political ideology to be one-dimensional, thereby providing substantial 
empirical support for the assumption (see also Rubin, 2001).  
Whether differences in political ideology would have any effects is an entirely 
different question to which a whole literature is devoted. Two factors speak against that 
the ideology of government has any real consequences through partisan politics. Firstly, 
Downs (1957) famously argued that rational voters cast their vote according to purely 
ideological signals since collecting information on the detailed intentions and planned 
policies of political parties is prohibitively costly. In most understandings of Downs’ 
theory of political competition parties therefore compete for the vote of the median 
voter by adjusting policies to his position. As this view suggests policy convergence 
towards the median position, it implies that political ideology does not matter because 
all parties pursue essentially identical policies. Even in sophisticated versions such as 
Roemer’s (1994) model where voters are uncertain about the economy and political 
parties therefore communicate ideological representations of it, a standard median voter 
result holds. Downsian political competition therefore leaves little or no room for any 
effects of partisan politics.  
However, cross-country differences in the ideological conviction of the 
median voter might potentially exert an influence. A complicating factor in this respect 
might be the parliamentary strength of the government. Even if partisan politics might 
have a potential effect, i.e. that governments would pursue partisan policies if they had 
the chance, their ability to carry such policies into effect depends on the degree of 
support for the policy in parliament. On the other hand, when governments’ ability to 
pursue partisan politics is curbed, the chances of a median voter outcome might be 
substantially higher. Along this line of thinking, strong governments might therefore be 
better able to pursue partisan ideological policies but reduce the probability of a 
median-voter consistent outcome. 
Secondly, Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) suggest that necessary political 
initiatives are often brought to being by the ideological side that is less likely to root for 
them. Making the point that this side is in a better position to signal credibility of the 
initiative as an objectively ‘good’ or necessary policy, they answer the question why it 
  5might “take a Nixon to go to China”. This would indicate that e.g. legal development, 
which is arguably a traditional rightwing core issue, might be faster when leftwing 
governments are in power if it is unpopular to reform the system or it would draw 
resources from more popular activities. Similar arguments apply with respect to other 
aspects of institutional development such as economic regulation and the size of 
government.  
These rather good arguments are nevertheless belied by Nordhaus’ (1975) and 
Hibbs’ (1977) classical studies of political business cycles, showing that unemployment 
and inflation is affected by the political ideology of incumbent governments. Reviewing 
the literature, Besley and Case (2003) also criticize the Downs-type assumptions about 
both politicians’ restricted motivation – winning votes - and their limited ability to 
credibly commit to advertised policies – the policies that won them the vote. The latter 
assumption in particular is crucial to most Downsian results. Yet, when e.g. parties have 
no reliable information about the effect of policy decisions on voting, Budge (1994) 
shows that not only do parties take an ideological position on policy instead of 
converging towards a Downsian median position, but this position is taken once and for 
all, i.e. parties will remain devoted to their professed ideology even for decades. He 
goes on to show that the model works well in explaining actual decisions made by 
parties in a sample of democratic countries, demonstrating that political decisions are 
often ideological. More recently, Lee Moretti and Butler (2004, 848) in an empirical 
study of US state elections decided by a narrow margin conclude that contrary to much 
theory, “voters do not affect policies […] but rather primarily elect policies” by electing 
politicians of specific ideological convictions who are likely to pursue these policies. In 
a survey chapter in a recent companion to public choice, Rubin (2001, 329) comes to 
the similar conclusion by noting that “a substantial body of empirical analysis of 
congressional voting […] has shown that ideological factors have considerable power in 
explaining congressional voting”. 
A related question is whether governments and countries of different political 
ideologies react differently to economic crisis. A number of economists and political 
scientists have argued that crisis can actually be beneficial for economic reforms by 
creating a situation in which the welfare losses to all parties involved are large enough 
to preclude political free-riding (e.g. Drazen and Grilli, 2003). The type of reform to be 
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might arguably react to crisis by strengthening legal and regulatory quality and reducing 
government expenditure while leftwing countries should a priori be more prone to 
expanding government involvement in the economy and weakening regulations by e.g. 
imposing price controls and similar measures to protect workers.  From a Downsian 
point of view, the median voter ideology determines the response to a crisis as this is the 
position that political parties will converge towards when forced to cooperate. 
Interpreted as an outcome of partisan politics, crisis responses are more difficult to 
predict as parties precisely need to find a common ground, although a case can be made 
that opposition parties might rationally support a partisan response of the incumbent 
government to lend it credibility and thus yield optimal impact although it would not be 
their preferred choice of response. 
A number of examples of responses to crisis can be derived from Zimmerman 
and Saalfeld (1988) who outline the reactions to the Great Depression of the 1930s in 
six European countries. The reactions in France, which had leftwing and centre-left 
coalition governments throughout the 1930s, and the United Kingdom, which was 
dominated by the Conservatives in much of the interwar period and has a strong 
liberalist economic tradition, can serve to exemplify the ideological reactions to similar 
economic crises. France responded to the depression by introducing collective 
bargaining, paid holidays, nationalizing companies and bringing the Banque de France 
firmly under government control through the Matignon agreement of 1936 while the 
centre-left government that remained in power until 1934 only made “fairly moderate” 
cuts in government expenditures compared to other continental European countries 
(Zimmerman and Saalfeld, 1988, 312). On the other hand, the United Kingdom reduced 
government expenditure as part of GDP from 17.3% to 14.6% between 1931 and 1934 
even when GDP decreased, and focussed on reducing taxes after 1934. Contrary to most 
other European countries, it never initiated an employment program but attempted to 
stimulate the economy through indirect market-based measures. The institutional 
responses in Denmark and Sweden fell somewhere in between the reactions in France 
and the United Kingdom. Denmark, which until the depression had been an 
economically liberalist country, broke radically with past policies and introduced price 
controls, extensive government regulation and publicly provided unemployment 
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underwent a similar development in the early 1930s, which also included the 
introduction of collective bargaining rights. In both countries, the response nevertheless 
also included guaranteeing the industry widespread freedom from state intervention as 
well as reforms of the central banks that increased their independence. The response of 
the Scandinavian countries can thus best be characterized as ideologically mixed and at 
first glance, the reactions to the depression may therefore be potentially be understood 
as consistent with the predominant political ideology in European countries. 
More recent examples from the quarter of a century between 1975 and 2000 
can provide additional support for this notion. Argentina, which has had rightwing 
governments for most of the period considered here, for example reacted to its crisis in 
the late 1980s by strengthening the legal system quite considerably, reducing 
government consumption from 13% to 11% of total consumption, and reducing the top 
marginal income tax from 62% to 35%.
1 New Zealand, another rightwing country, 
reacted to its crisis in the late 1970s by strengthening the legal system by almost three 
points on a ten-point scale. At the other half of the ideology spectrum, leftist 
governments in Venezuela reacted to the debt crisis in the early 1980s by reducing legal 
quality by about one point to give governments more leeway for widespread 
intervention, and the similarly leftwing Jamaica that experienced economic difficulties 
throughout the 1990s failed to reform its regulations of business and labour and even 
introduced interest rate regulations at a time when governments in the rest of the world 
on average substantially deregulated their economies (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). 
Again, these examples of crisis responses can readily be understood as traditional 
ideological reactions. 
In sum, despite that the influence of Downs’ theory of political competition 
can hardly be exaggerated, there are hence strong indications that partisan politics may 
be a feature of the real world. On the other hand, it does not preclude any effect of 
Downsian median positions; judging from the examples above, the effects of median 
ideology may in particular work in association with economic crisis. The main 
questions here are whether political ideology also affects policy outcomes across 
countries and not just in the US and whether the examples above are representative of 
                                                 
1 These data derive from Gwartney and Lawson (2002), which is also the source of the institutional 
indicators to be used in the following. 
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needed. This indicator also opens the possibility of considering culturally determined 
ideological positions of the median voter, as will be discussed in the following. 
 
III. A cross-country indicator of political ideology 
Compared to the measures used in the many studies on US states, the present indicator 
of political ideology is by necessity less sophisticated. A variant of the measure used in 
the following was introduced in Bjørnskov (2005) drawing on the work of Beck et al. 
(2001) who categorized parties in a large number of countries according to whether they 
are leftwing, center parties or rightwing. The measure adopted in the following builds 
on this work by placing parties on a discrete left-to-right scale where leftwing parties 
are assigned the value -1, center parties 0 and rightwing parties 1. The value of 
government ideology gt in any period beginning in year t between 1976 and 2000, the 
years covered by Beck et al. (2001), is the weighted sum of the ideology ijk of the three 
largest parties in government at time k. The weight sjk is the share of party j of the total 
seats in parliament held by the government at time k and thus reflects the influence on 
government by any ideological category represented. As such, I implicitly assume that 
the real influence on government policy of any party is proportional to the share of seats 
held by that party.
2 The ideology is thereafter averaged over each 5-year period (x=5) to 



















       ( 1 )  
 
Averaging across years allows capturing the effects of ideology in different countries 
across the same period regardless of whether or not government power shifted within 
the period. By dividing parties into only three categories, the ideology measure 
necessarily becomes rather crude and imprecise. This imprecision can nevertheless be 
interpreted as a feature of the real world, as parties can hardly be placed accurately in a 
                                                 
2 The weighting scheme is the important difference to the indicator utilized in Bjørnskov (2005), which 
only captured the ideology of the largest government party. It can therefore be argued that the present 
indicator is more precise. 
  9left-to-right scheme. Instead, the ideology of parties can be placed only within a vicinity 
of some exact ideal position. Although a scale with more steps would be preferable, the 
crudeness of gt may to some extent reflect this indistinctness of real-world politics. It 
should be remembered that higher values of g imply more rightwing political positions. 
In the following, I also use the average ideology in the entire period 1976-
2000 (x=25), which thus becomes a measure of median citizen rather than government 
ideology – i.e. the political ideology of the median voter, given an assumption that the 
former is relatively stable across time. While any interpretation of the former indicator 
must logically take the possibility of partisan politics discussed above as a starting 
point, it is necessary to turn to both intuitive political arguments and results from 
experimental economics and the so-called happiness literature in order to interpret the 
potential effects of the latter indicator. Simple informal political arguments suggest that 
ideology can be used as a proxy for e.g. tolerance of income inequality (Alesina and 
Angeletos, 2005). For example, Marxists would find inequality strongly unfair and 
detrimental to society since it in their weltanschauung or mental model would be a 
signal that someone (the ‘bourgeoisie’) exploits the population at large. Individuals with 
a purely Hayekian mental model of society, on the other hand, would probably see 
inequality as natural and fair since it reflects differences in ability, skills and work 
effort; income inequality would even be desirable due to its efficiency effects. These 
ideological differences could well be expected to become visible in redistributive 
policies and the extent of government production and marginal taxation. 
Supplementing these reflections, experimental studies show that individuals’ 
merit assumptions and equity-efficiency trade-offs are significantly associated with 
political ideology and influence their behavior in economic experiments (Mitchell et al., 
1993; Scott et al., 2001; Michelbach et al., 2003). Hence, it appears that people on the 
political right wing tend to be more tolerant of inequality and behave accordingly, as 
they ascribe inequality to merit and efficiency to a larger degree than their political 
opponents. On the other hand, voters on the left wing seem to have stronger need 
considerations, which could potentially lead to stronger support for redistribution and 
extensive social security nets and therefore support for a larger government sector. The 
experimental studies hence also support the use of political ideology as a proxy for a set 
of social norms associated with work and inequality. Such norms and mental models are 
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(1994, 15) for example make the point that “the cultural heritage provides a means of 
reducing the divergence in the mental models that people in a society have and also 
constitutes a means for the intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions”. Not only 
are mental models or weltanschauung a cultural feature, given the intergenerational 
transfer it is also likely to be relatively stable across time. 
An altogether different strategy to the essentially same question is provided by 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) who show that political ideology is associated with 
how different events affect individuals’ subjective life satisfaction. Quite irrationally, 
individuals of a specific political conviction appear to be substantially happier when 
‘their’ type of government is in power irrespective of the policies pursued by the 
government. Of more importance to the present topic, the paper finds that individuals’ 
unemployment/inflation trade-offs vary with their political ideology. Individuals’ 
subjective life satisfaction is hurt more by unemployment when they vote on the left 
wing while they are more averse to inflation when voting on the right wing. Not 
surprisingly, the life satisfaction of voters on the left wing varies positively with 
government consumption while it does not exert a significant influence on rightwing 
voters. The study consequently demonstrates that political ideology is closely associated 
with voters’ preferences for policy outcomes. 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) as well as the experimental studies noted 
above accordingly provide ample support for the view that individuals either have 
different mental models of the economy or at least weigh outcomes differently and that 
these preferences vary systematically with their political conviction. In other words, the 
findings and the simple political argument connect political ideology to preferences and 
mental models of the economy arising from differences in individuals’ weltanschauung. 
With respect to the dependent variables in the following, it should therefore be expected 
that leftwing preferences for government involvement show up in the results below if 
partisan politics exist. Rightwing preferences for protection of property rights and legal 
quality might also appear due to a desire to protect merit and the gains from talent and 
effort as the simple theoretical digression in Bjørnskov (2005) suggests. Finally, the 
quality of regulation could likewise be influenced by ideology as it includes the degree 
of individual wage formation, price controls and overall reliance on market 
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ideology affect all governments alike is an empirical question. The main question is 
therefore whether the two indicators of political ideology affect the size of government, 
the quality of the legal system, and the quality of regulations of business, credit and 
labor. 
 
IV. Data and estimation strategy 
The data on the dependent variables derive from the Canadian Fraser Institute that 
publishes the so-called economic freedom indices (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). These 
indices are distributed from 0 (no quality) to 10 (perfect quality) by drawing on data 
from various primary sources; the indices are published once every five years for a large 
set of countries. As these variables are bounded on the interval [0;10], the dependent 
variables in the following are the economic freedom indices rescaled by dividing any 
original score x with 10-x such that they are distributed across R+. 
I use only three of the five available indices composed of the following 
elements, as these three are often found to have real economic effects. The ‘Size of 
government: expenditure, taxes and enterprises’ index is intended to capture “the extent 
to which countries rely on individual choice and markets rather than the political 
process to allocate resources and goods and services” (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002, 6). 
It is composed of government consumption as a percentage of total consumption, 
transfers and subsidies as percentage of GDP, government enterprises and investment as 
a percentage of total investment, and the extent of marginal taxation. It must be 
remembered in the following that the index is constructed such that higher values imply 
less government involvement in the economy.  ‘Legal structure and security of property 
rights’ is composed of indices capturing judicial independence, the impartiality of 
courts, the protection of intellectual property, military inference in the rule of law, and 
the integrity of the legal system. The final indicator to be used here, ‘Regulation of 
credit, labor, and business’, is composed of a set of indices on each of the three areas of 
regulation including among others measures of ownership of foreign banks and interest 
controls, the share of workers with wages set through centralized bargaining, the 
generosity of unemployment benefits and minimum wages, and price controls and 
administrative obstacles to starting new businesses.  
  12The size of government indicator is thus composed of objective measures 
although the measures going into the index can be discussed. Conversely, there is an 
inevitable element of subjectivity in the indicators of the quality of the legal system and 
regulation, which might yield results less reliable. Moreover, some scholars of law flatly 
reject the idea that notions of such complex features can be reduced to simple numerical 
measures. Siems (2004) consequently discusses the arguments for and against such 
measures and the merits and problems of different approaches. He eventually concludes 
that in order to support general claims, it is necessary to complement traditional detailed 
legal case studies with more broadly focused studies as is the tradition in economics, 
which makes the use of simple numerical measures necessary. Although it is 
undoubtedly problematic to develop good measures for such complex conceptions as 
legal systems or the quality of regulation, the Fraser indices employed in the following 
have been widely used and are usually assessed to be good indicators of institutional 
development.
3 Moreover, the indices more clearly delineate different aspects of 
economic freedom and institutional development than alternatives such as the much-
used governance indices utilized in Kaufman and Kraay (2002). 
The choice of control variables is informed by previous studies; the sources of 
all variables are listed in Appendix Table A1. Most studies on institutional quality find 
that income is important – as noted in the introduction, the maintenance and 
administration of proper legal and regulatory systems is expensive. Furthermore, voters 
in relatively rich countries may tend to demand and be willing to pay for the provision 
of more public goods. I therefore include GDP per capita in the baseline specification 
used in all analyses. The baseline also includes the logarithm to population size, as there 
could be economies of scale in providing institutional services (Knack, 2002). As a 
response to recent influential critiques of the growth literature, claiming that openness 
and economic integration affects growth primarily by creating incentives for 
institutional development, I include openness to trade adjusted for the logarithm to 
                                                 
3 Besides the description in Gwartney and Lawson (2002), de Haan and Sturm (2000) and Paldam (2003) 
discuss the properties and validity of the economic freedom indices. Although de Hann and Sturm (2000) 
criticize the government size index, and in particular the way the tax burden is included, both conclude 
that the indices are fairly decent measures of economic freedom and institutional quality. However, in the 
present context another critique might be that government consumption includes consumption at all levels 
of government. To the extent that local governments are free to decide on expenditures, ideological 
effects across counties or municipalities will only show in the estimates presented here to the extent that 
voting patterns at the local level follows patterns at the national level. 
  13population size in the baseline (e.g. Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik et al., 2000). This also 
controls for Rodrik’s (1998) compensation hypothesis of globalization, which assumes 
that government consumption plays a risk-reducing role in countries particularly 
exposed to international fluctuations through trade. 
I also include the percentage of a population that is older than 64 and therefore 
past the normal working age, which provides a measure of the age burden that 
inevitably increases government involvement whenever a public pension system exists. 
With respect to regulations, it could be expected that if a significant part of the 
electorate is outside the labor market there is less demand for quality regulations of such 
aspects of the economy while age structure could potentially affect legal quality through 
two channels. Individual support for investment in legal quality must logically rest on 
an insurance argument, as better legal quality protects them against adverse future 
events. Hence, older voters with a shorter time horizon might demand relatively smaller 
expenditures on the legal system, all other things being equal. The other channel arises 
as a heavy age burden places demands on government spending for health care and 
pensions, thereby potentially shifting spending away from for example the legal system.  
In all cases I include dummies for different legal systems; this is done by 
including dummies capturing the legal origin of a country, i.e. whether a country has a 
common or civil law system; the baseline comparison is thus the mixed German and 
Scandinavian systems. With respect to legal quality, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue 
that countries with common law have better performing legal systems. However, a 
dummy for common law also captures the effects of having been under British colonial 
rule and thus the effects of British institutional transplants that might not be limited to 
the legal system. Following recent studies I also include a measure of ethnic diversity in 
the regressions in the following to take into account any special political effects of 
having a polarized society (Keefer and Knack, 2002; Alesina et al., 2003; Annett, 2003).  
Finally, I take two complicating factors into considerations: 1) the 
parliamentary strength of the government, which is a measure of (lack of) political 
competition; and 2) the potential effects of economic crisis. To capture the first 
possibility, I enter an indicator of political competition, measured as the 25-year average 
of the ratio between seats in parliament held by government parties to seats in 
parliament held by opposition parties. This variable, while capturing the tradition for 
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power based on historical observations. Alternatively, I use the five-year average 
political competition, denoted ‘political competition, current’. I interact these variables 
with the two ideology indicators to test whether the potential effects of ideology depend 
on the political bargaining power of the incumbent government.
4 To test for the 
potential effects of having an economic crisis, I include a variable intended to capture 
the occurrence of economic crises. The variable is a dummy that takes the value one if 
one of two criteria is satisfied: 1) economic growth is negative in the five-year period in 
question; or 2) the growth rate is less than half of that of the preceding period, unless 
the preceding period was characterized by particularly high growth.
5 These criteria do 
not capture all crises, but it can be argued that periods in which one of these criteria are 
satisfied must include some form of economic crisis. All regressions also include period 
dummies and dummies for Asia and the Pacific region, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the post-
communist countries. 
For two reasons, I restrict the sample by the condition that countries are fully 
democratic, defined as having an average score in any five-year period of three or less 
on the Gastil index (Freedom House, 2003). Firstly, a 25-year average makes no sense 
as an indicator of citizen ideology and the associated social norms and mental models 
and secondly, the median voter theorem and all interpretations resting on the theorem 
would be invalid if voters have not been politically free to express their true 
preferences. Given this restriction, the sample of democratic countries with full data 
employed in the following is limited to including 58 countries, 26 of which are 
developed, 5 post-communist, and 27 developing countries. The panel is therefore 
unbalanced both in terms of geographical coverage and democratic legacy. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics on the variables; all countries included in the sample are 
listed in Appendix Table A2. As such, the average country is about the level of 
                                                 
4 I also tested extensively for effects of changes in government strength by including five-year averages 
of this variable. However, these tests produced no results what so ever and are therefore not reported in 
the following. 
 
5 The average growth rate in this sample is 1.5% pa. High growth is defined as the double of that, i.e. 3% 
pa. 
  15development of Hungary or Chile but with a longer democratic legacy than these 
countries. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
When estimating the effects of political ideology in the present panel of countries, four 
problems present themselves: endogeneity, contemporaneous errors, serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity. With respect to the first problem, there is only limited reason to 
believe that any effect is evidence of the reverse causation when estimating the effects 
of ideology on institutional indicators. For example, it is difficult (although maybe not 
impossible) to argue for an improvement in general legal quality resulting in the 
electorate voting for a government of a specific political ideology. On the other hand, 
the size of government could for example affect the support for rightwing countries if 
the electorate in general finds it to be excessive. This would nonetheless tend to 
generate a negative correlation between the government size index and political 
ideology, i.e. the ‘wrong’ sign. In other words, such potential endogeneity tends to bias 
the estimate on ideology towards zero. All coefficients with the expected sign should 
therefore logically be interpreted as support for the general hypothesis of this paper. The 
possibility also exists that economic freedom and political ideology are jointly 
determined by some underlying factor. In the present case, this does not constitute a 
problem as such an underlying factor would most likely be a set of social norms 
determining the median voter ideology, i.e. a latent factor that measures one of the 
potential explanatory factors. 
The second problem listed above is not likely to be a major concern here 
either. Contemporaneous errors from joint regional shocks are picked up by the regional 
dummies and at a more disaggregated level any institutional spill-overs resulting from 
e.g. demonstration effects or learning are more likely to work in a longer run than the 
five-year intervals applied here. To overcome the last problems, the choice of estimation 
procedure is random effects (RE), which is a preferable choice since it allows the 
simultaneous estimation of government and citizen ideology, i.e. both time-varying and 
time-invariant factors. As final tests, I report estimates obtained through either 
excluding potential outlier observations, thus testing whether these observations drive 
  16results, and through country fixed effects (FE), which can inform about how to interpret 
the effects of ideology. As noted above, the effects could be due to either ideologically 
influenced government actions or be the results of the social norms and beliefs of the 
electorate. As the latter features are likely to change very slowly over time, removing 
the between variation removes most of the variation due to citizen ideology and leaves 
only the effects of ideological government action; i.e. of pure government ideology.
6 If 
the effects of the government ideology measure survive FE estimation, they are 
consequently most likely to reflect ideological acts of government that influence the rate 
of institutional development. Another benefit of the FE estimates is that they take into 
account the effects of generalized trust and income inequality found in a number of 
papers (la Porta et al., 1997; Svensson, 1998; Keefer and Knack; 2002; Knack, 2002). 
These features are left out due to limited availability across countries (trust) and time 
(inequality).
7   
 
V. Empirical findings 
Before employing the full models, it might be instructive to turn to simple differences in 
the raw data. As a first indication of any potential effects, it can be observed in Table 1 
that countries with a government ideology below average score 0.65 lower on the size 
of government index than countries above average, a difference that is strongly 
significant. These countries also score significantly lower on regulation (0.25) while the 
differences in the raw data between countries on legal quality (0.16) or on the degree of 
democracy are small and insignificant.  One could hence be tempted to reach the 
conclusion that government ideology affects the size of government and the quality of 
regulations in the expected direction. As these differences could nevertheless be entirely 
spurious, I report the results of regressing economic freedom on a set of control 
variables and the measures of government and citizen ideology.  Each of the three 
indicators is treated in turn in the following. 
                                                 
6 Rice and Feldman (1997) for example note that certain aspects of social norms and values from the 
original home countries seem to have survived for generations in families that emigrated to the US 
generations ago. Uslaner (2004) reaches a similar conclusion by showing how Americans’ propensity to 
trust strangers is to a surprising degree determined by the current trust level of the country of origin of 
their ancestors who arrived in the US generations ago. 
 
7 That the exclusion of these variables is not a serious problem when estimating the effects of either 
government or citizen ideology is indicated by the very low correlations (0-0.14) between them and the 
ideology measures. 
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V.I. The size of government 
Firstly, Table 2 reports the results of employing the size of government as the dependent 
variable. As can be seen in the bottom panel of the table, the specification does a good 
job explaining the variation and a random effects specification is warranted by the LM 
tests. The bulk of the explanatory power comes from the time-dependent intercepts and 
two control variables. Richer countries tend to have larger government sectors, reflected 
in a lower index (hence the negative sign), and ethnically diverse countries have smaller 
government sectors. The latter finding apparently contradicts the results in Annett 
(2003) while Alesina et al. (2003) find negative effects of ethnic diversity on other 
aspects of government involvement such as transfers and subsidies.
8 Age structure, 
proxying for the age burden, surprisingly does not exert and influence on the size of 
government although it could affect the composition of its constituent parts. The effect 
of openness is also insignificant and hence contradicts Rodrik’s (1998) finding that 
more open countries have larger government sectors. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the main question of the paper, only government ideology is significant in 
the first columns. However, when allowing for the effects of citizen ideology to vary 
with the 25-year average of political competition, this measure becomes strongly 
significant as does the interaction term. The results support the notion that the 
ideological convictions of the electorate matter for the size of government but more so 
when political competition is fierce. The effect of government ideology, on the other 
hand, arises no matter how strong the government is. Finally, the crisis variable and its 
interaction term do not reach significance although their inclusion causes the coefficient 
on citizen ideology to increase.
9
 
                                                 
8 When looking deeper into this issue, the effect, which is only borderline significant, surprisingly turns 
out to arise mainly due to a set of relatively rich and diverse countries. As such, when one excludes 
relatively poor democracies ethnic diversity becomes strongly significant. 
 
9 This may nevertheless be a spurious effect as the inclusion of the crisis dummy and an interaction term 
only raises the Chi square marginally from 73.8 to 75.1 when using the same sample. 
  18V.II. Legal quality 
As the second theme, I address the potential effects of political ideology on the quality 
of the legal system and the security of property rights in Table 3. The baseline 
specification does a more than decent job of explaining the variation both between and 
within countries although the LM tests reject the need for random effects. The results 
firstly show that richer countries have substantially better legal systems. There is, 
however, no evidence to support that openness is associated with better legal quality, 
thus contradicting the conclusions by Rodrik et al. (2002). Neither do the legal origins 
or ethnic diversity matter, as suggested by previous research (Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002; Keefer and Knack, 2002). There is nevertheless a strong effect of age structure, 
suggesting that countries with aging populations all other things being equal have lower 
legal quality. As noted above, this effect could arise because such countries save on 
legal expenses to make up for higher expenses to pensions and health care, but could 
also arise as a voting effect since older voters have shorter time horizons and therefore 
weaker preferences for long-term investments.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the effects of ideology, the table clearly shows that government ideology 
does not exert any influence. The effects of citizen ideology are in the expected 
direction but also fail to be significant in the first three columns. When allowing for 
effects to vary both with political competition and the occurrence of economic crisis, the 
effects of citizen ideology nevertheless become well identified. Judging from the 
substantial increase in explanatory power between nations, the inclusion of differential 
effects with different degrees of political competition and during crisis is certainly 
justified.
10 The estimates suggest once again that the effects of citizen ideology are more 
pronounced the more political competition there is, i.e. a more competitive political 
process is more responsive to the preferences of the median voter. On the other hand, a 
competitive political process also seems to lower the general legal quality, and it turns 
out that leftwing countries react to crisis by strengthening the legal system more than 
                                                 
10 When using the same samples, the inclusion of political competition and an interaction term raises the 
Chi square by 10.2 points and the inclusion of crisis effects raises it by 9.5 points. Both sets must 
therefore be considered jointly significant. 
  19rightwing countries do. As the interaction variable is citizen ideology, not government 
ideology, the latter effect can logically not be consistent with Cukierman and Tomassi’s 
(1998) conjecture that the wrong ideological side often is in a better position to go 
through with unpopular reforms during crises. A more reasonable interpretation could 
for example be that rightwing countries might be less apt to strengthen legal quality as 
they already have superior legal systems, all other things being equal. Economic crisis 
therefore more likely induces countries with leftwing median voters to converge 
towards more rightwing countries along this dimension of institutional development. 
 
V.III. Regulation 
The final dimension of economic freedom to be addressed is the quality of regulation of 
business, credit and labor; the results are reported in Table 4. Once again, the baseline 
variables do a good job explaining slightly more than a third of the variation in the data 
although the between variation is substantially better explained than the within-nation 
variation. The LM tests also support the choice of a random effects estimator. Looking 
at the control variables, GDP is only weakly significant in one specification while 
ethnic diversity is positive and significant in three of the four specifications. The most 
surprising result in the control variables, however, is that common law countries seem 
to have substantially better regulations than either countries with civil law or mixed 
systems. Contrary to the findings on legal quality, the effect suggests that the difference 
in regulatory quality is a consequence of the system per se and not the result of colonial 
origins, as the coefficient does not change if one excludes developing countries (not 
shown). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the main question, the table shows that only the effect citizen ideology on 
the quality of regulations is significant in all specifications; government ideology is 
never near significance and even changes sign. However, the coefficient on citizen 
ideology is strongly increased when allowing for the effect to vary with political 
competition and the occurrence of economic crisis. While these effects are never 
individually significant, their inclusion is warranted by the increase in explanatory 
  20power between nations. As is the case for legal quality, countries with a leftwing 
political tradition seem to react to crisis by deregulating the economy while the effects 
of citizen ideology are stronger in politically more competitive environments.
11
 
V.IV. Robustness to outliers and fixed effects 
As a final area of exploration, I turn to the robustness of these effects to the exclusion of 
potential outliers and the inclusion of country fixed effects, which can inform about 
how to interpret the effects of ideology. The results are reported in Table 5 that also 
reports the standard Hausman test between random and fixed effects specifications. 
Starting with the government size results, age structure becomes weakly significant in 
the RE column while GDP per capita and government ideology lose significance. On 
the other hand, citizen ideology becomes strongly significant as does the effects of 
political competition and the interaction term between ideology and competition. 
Conversely, the variables capturing crisis response do not approach significance. The 
more robust estimates in Table 5 hence support that the ideological convictions of the 
electorate affect the size of government in the expected direction – rightwing countries 
have smaller governments – but also that this effect is substantially stronger whenever 
the political process is more competitive. Conversely, the estimates suggest that 
countries with a more competitive political tradition have larger government sectors, 
perhaps due to a need to support a larger variety of political and economic preferences, 
which would generate higher government consumption. Column two in the table 
nonetheless also carries a different message, as the fixed effects estimate strongly 
supports that rightwing governments are associated with smaller government sectors. 
Although the Hausman test suggests the use of an RE specification, the FE estimate has 
the advantage of being free of multicollinearity problems between government and 
citizen ideology, which in Table 2 can have concealed the effect of the political 
convictions of governments. The FE estimates therefore provide additional evidence of 
an effect of partisan politics. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
11 With identical samples, the inclusion of political competition and an interaction term with citizen 
ideology raises the Chi square by 8.5 points but the inclusion of crisis effects only raises it be about 1.5 
points. The first is therefore jointly significant while the second inclusion appears doubtful. 
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Turning to columns three and four that report on the robustness of effects on legal 
quality, these results neither appear to be driven by outlier observations. A rightwing 
citizen ideology contributes to legal quality although more in countries with a strong 
tradition of political competition while competition in itself seems to lower legal 
quality. The fixed effects estimates simply show that government ideology does not 
exert any influence and although the Hausman test suggests the use of the FE 
specification, it is only significant at p<.10, indicating that the differences between FE 
and RE might be limited. It is nevertheless worth noting that GDP per capita are very 
far from being significant in column four, suggesting that economic growth may not 
lead to better legal quality. 
Finally, columns five and six report on the robustness of results pertaining to 
regulatory quality. Again, the FE specification is only slightly preferred to the RE 
specification, which conclusions therefore rest upon. First of all, the effect of citizen 
ideology is strongly significant when excluding outliers, thereby indicating that effects 
are not driven by these observations. The findings also show that the effect of median 
voter ideology is stronger in more competitive political processes, although this effect is 
not as pronounced as in the two other cases. On the other hand, the ideological response 
to economic crisis becomes significant at p<.10, indicating that leftwing countries may 
have been more prone to deregulating during crises. However, the same alternative 
interpretation exists as in the case of legal quality. As a final feature to note, economic 
development over time is associated with lower regulatory quality in the FE 
specification that also rejects that government ideology has any effects on this aspect of 
institutional development. 
In summary, the results show that both government and citizen ideology 
matter although for different aspects of institutional development. Government ideology 
affects the size of government with rightwing governments intervening less in the 
economy while citizen ideology affects all three dimensions of economic freedom.
12 
                                                 
12 For future research employing the economic freedom data, an additional result is the absence of 
evidence of an ideological bias in the indices. Previous studies have confirmed the reliability of the data 
but have left the possibility that the predominantly rightwing conviction of the researchers who created 
the indices may have implied a bias in favor of rightwing governments. If this were the case, it should be 
expected that a shift towards a rightwing ideology would affect all of the five indices, all other things 
being equal. However, the results clearly show that this is the case only for the size of government, which 
  22The literature on growth and institutions show that the long-run effects of such changes 
on economic activity are difficult to neglect. The findings are therefore discussed in the 
final section. 
 
VI. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Political ideology has always been and will in all likelihood remain a highly 
controversial and disputed issue. This paper has ventured into the debate by asking the 
question whether political ideology affects three indicators of economic freedom 
capturing the quality of national institutions and the size of government. Following a 
short theoretical discussion of how to measure ideology and distinguish between 
government and citizen ideology, the paper employed the categorizations by Beck et al. 
(2001) to form indicators of the former as average ideology over five-year periods and 
the latter as the long-term propensity of the population to vote to the right of the middle. 
Empirical analyses confirm that both have effects and that such distinction is important. 
The estimates moreover demonstrate that the effects of political ideology are of 
economic and political significance as well. The findings consequently provide a better 
understanding of previous cross-country results in e.g. Huber and Stephens (2000) and 
Bjørnskov (2005) as well as extending findings from US states to a cross-country 
context. Furthermore, the results emphasize the importance of political competition and 
the different responses to crisis in countries with different political ideologies, as 
countries with a rightwing ideology seem to have some tendency to strengthen legal and 
regulatory quality as a response to crisis.  
The effect of a shift in government ideology on the size of government can 
hardly be interpreted as anything else but an effect of partisan politics. The estimates 
suggest that going from an ideologically neutral government to a government ‘one 
standard deviation’ to the right of the middle induces an increase in the size of 
government index of about 10% of a standard deviation no matter how small or large a 
majority the government has in parliament. This finding thus reflects similar results 
from comparisons of US states (Berry et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2004). On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                               
rests on entirely objective primary indicators. Further analyses not reported in this paper demonstrate that 
the remaining economic freedom indices – ‘sound money’ and ’freedom to trade internationally’ – are 
also unaffected by government ideology. There is thus no reason to believe that such bias exists, which 
obviously strengthens the empirical basis for using the indices. 
  23the effect of citizen ideology depends on the strength of the government. At average 
political competition (2.86), a shock to citizen ideology exerts a 10% increase in the 
government size index while at complete parity between the government and the 
opposition the same shock would generate an increase of 23% of a standard deviation.  
The importance of political competition is replicated in the cases of legal and 
regulatory quality. While these dimensions of economic freedom are unaffected by the 
ideology of the incumbent government, both are strongly affected by citizen ideology. 
At average political competition, a one deviation shock to citizen ideology generates an 
increase in legal quality of approximately 13% of a standard deviation while at political 
parity the same shock would generate a 29% increase in legal quality although the 
increase in political competition in itself would induce a small decrease in legal quality 
of about 8% of a standard deviation. Likewise, a one deviation shock to citizen ideology 
would at average government strength generate an improvement of regulatory quality of 
about 14% of a standard deviation while the effect at political parity would be about 
50% larger (21% of a standard deviation). Along both of the latter dimensions, there 
also seems to be a differential response to economic crisis, which goes in the opposite 
direction as what would intuitively be expected. The effects of citizen ideology are 
therefore of economic significance and may also be difficult to ignore from a 
politological point of view. 
In principle, two different interpretations present themselves to the effects of 
the ideology of citizens. From a political economy perspective, the effects could reflect 
a purely ideological preference of the voters that any government regardless of its own 
ideology must take into consideration in its dealings with the national institutions. In 
this perspective, the demand of the median voter for institutional quality is affected by 
citizen ideology and the Downsian median voter result can hence be maintained along 
this dimension of voting. Indeed, as the institutional response to citizen ideology 
depends strongly on political competition, these findings are entirely consistent with a 
Downsian explanation, as parties in highly competitive political environments most 
probably would have to find a compromise consistent with the median voter ideology if 
they are to stay in power. Furthermore, increased political competition implies 
politically weaker governments, which also lends more room for the preferences of the 
  24median voter. With allowance for the importance of political competition, the findings 
are therefore easily reconcilable with standard theories of the political process. 
As noted above, experiments indicate that citizens’ political ideology also 
comes with a set of social norms and beliefs or mental models of how society works. 
The recent literature on social capital therefore alternatively suggests that such norms 
and beliefs per se can have real economic and political effects that are not necessarily 
negotiated through the political system while it is likely that citizen ideology captures 
factors such as merit assumptions that Bjørnskov (2005) argues lead voters to demand 
better protection of property rights. This literature suggests that social norms can 
directly affect the efficiency of society and hence implies that citizen ideology could 
shift the supply curve of institutional quality through e.g. lowering bureaucratic 
transaction costs.  
Overall, since the alternative social capital theory suffers from an inability to 
explain why effects depend on the degree of political competition, the findings in this 
paper support a standard Downsian effect of the political ideology of the median voter. 
If voters are indeed ignorant or indifferent of the importance of economic institutions, 
the social capital theory may nevertheless seem a reasonable complementary 
explanation that cannot a priori be rejected. Which interpretation is the more relevant as 
well as a number of other questions are left to future research. In the meantime, the 
evidence presented here gives rather strong support for standard theories of voters’ 
demand for institutional policy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Average  Standard  deviation  Observations 
  All observations 
Government ideology   0.06  0.69  297 
Citizen ideology  0.03  0.51  244 















Democracy (Gastil index)  1.59  0.68  278 
GDP per capita  10,604  7,072  278 
Openness 69.06  43.16  278 
Population, mil.  33.30  97.09  276 
Age over 64  8.54  4.61  300 
Ethnic diversity  32.62  22.61  300 
Crisis 0.23  0.42  262 
Political competition  2.86  5.16  224 
  Below average government ideology 
Size of government  4.98  1.56  127 
Legal structure  6.39  1.68  123 
Regulation 5.83  0.96  127 
Democracy (Gastil index)  1.64  0.70  145 
Crisis 0.24  0.42  128 
Political competition  2.36  1.78  111 
  Above average government  ideology 
Size of government  5.63  1.46  142 
Legal structure  6.55  1.74  138 
Regulation 6.08  0.91  143 
Democracy (Gastil index)  1.51  0.65  153 
Crisis 0.22  0.42  134 
Political competition  3.35  7.03  113 
Note: numbers in parentheses refer to the rescaled economic freedom indices used in the analyses. 
 
  31Table 2. Determinants of government size 
Dependent variable  Size of government 
Estimation  method  RE RE RE RE 








































































Political competition, current    .0007 
(.0109) 
  
Strength * gov. ideology    -.0094 
(.0224) 
  








Crisis      -.1990 
(.1406) 
Crisis * cit. ideology        -.0189 
(.3072) 
Observations  216 211 190 188 
Countries  58 58 45 44 
Pseudo R square   Between  .415  .425  .434  .400 
  Within  .276 .279 .264 .290 
Wald Chi Squared / F-statistic  88.32  88.20  76.12  74.26 
Breusch-Pagan LM test  39.66***  38.00***  17.01***  16.92*** 
Hausman test (FE)         
Note: all regressions contain period dummies, regional effects, a dummy for communist regime and a 
constant term; t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<0.05) [p<.10]. 
 
  32Table 3. Determinants of legal quality 
Dependent variable  Legal system and property rights 
Estimation method  RE  RE  RE  RE 
























Age over 64  -.1861 
(.0586) 














































Political competition, current    -.0052 
(.0245) 
  
Strength * gov. ideology    .0211 
(.0543) 
  








Crisis       .3921 
(.3289) 
Crisis * cit. ideology        -.4434 
(.6729) 
Observations 210  205  184  182 
Countries 58  58  45  44 
Pseudo R square   Between  .589  .579  .559  .657 
 Within  .394  .402  .416  .417 
Wald Chi Squared / F-statistic  204.63  201.80  153.32  194.07 
Breusch-Pagan LM test  2.69  1.85  .32  .32 
Hausman test (FE)         
Note: all regressions contain period dummies, regional effects, a dummy for communist regime and a 
constant term; t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<0.05) [p<.10]. 
  33Table 4. Determinants of regulatory quality 
Dependent variable  Regulation of business, credit and labour 
Estimation  method  RE RE RE RE 








































































Political competition, current    -.0097 
(.0092) 
  
Strength * gov. ideology    .0201 
(.0195) 
  








Crisis       -.1912 
(.1204) 
Crisis * cit. ideology        -.1912 
(.2569) 
Observations  216 211 190 188 
Countries  58 58 45 44 
Pseudo R square   Between  .435  .437  .510  .505 
  Within  .277 .286 .279 .306 
Wald Chi Squared / F-statistic  102.59  106.52  100.01  97.48 
Breusch-Pagan LM test  15.56***  14.19***  6.68***  8.82*** 
Hausman test (FE)         
Note: all regressions contain period dummies, regional effects, a dummy for communist regime and a 
constant term; t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<0.05) [p<.10]. 
 
  34Table 5. Determinants of economic freedom, robustness 
Dependent variable  Government size  Legal quality  Regulatory quality 
Estimation  method  RE FE RE FE RE FE 
























































































































Observations  174 216 175 182 174 188 
Countries  43 58 44 44 44 44 
Pseudo  R  sq.  Between  .616 .012 .693 .002 .509 .000 
  Within  .412 .357 .507 .476 .518 .351 
Chi Squared / F-statistic  147.02  9.17  225.73  10.50  166.01  6.54 
Breusch-Pagan LM test  22.57***    1.42    27.57***   
Hausman test (FE)    1.06    16.64*    17.77* 
Note: all regressions contain period dummies, regional effects, a dummy for communist regime and a 
constant term; t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<0.05) [p<.10]. 
 Outliers excluded in the RE estimates are defined as observations with either a residual of more than ±2 
standard deviations.  
 
  
  35Table A1. Sources of variables 
Source Name Description 
Size of government  Government involvement in the economy. 




Regulation  Quality of regulation of business, credit and labor. 
Penn World Tables, 
Mark 6.1 
GDP per capita  Gross Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity. The methodology is described in detail in 
Heston et al. (2002). 
  Openness  Imports plus exports as percentage of GDP, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity. 
  Population size  Size of population. 
World Bank (2004)  Age over 64  Percentage of population that is over age 64. 
CIA (2003)  Common law  Dummies for legal system. 
 Civil  law   
Alesina et al. (2003)  Ethnic diversity  The probability that two random citizens of a given country 
do not belong to the same ethnic group. 
Freedom House 
(2003) 
Democracy  Political rights, measured on scale from one (full rights) to 
seven (no rights). 
Own variables  Crisis   Dummy variable taking value one if either growth is 
negative or is half that of the preceding period. 
 Political 
competition 
Ratio of seats in parliament held by government parties to 
seats held by opposition parties. When denoted current, the 
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Table A2. Countries included 
Country Country Country 
Argentina  Guinea-Bissau  Portugal 
Australia Guyana  Romania 
Austria Hungary  Senegal 
Barbados Iceland  South Africa 
Belgium India  South  Korea 
Botswana Ireland  Spain 
Brazil Israel  Sri  Lanka 
Bulgaria Italy  Sweden 
Canada Jamaica Switzerland 
Chile Japan  Taiwan 
Colombia Luxembourg  Thailand 
Costa Rica  Madagascar  Trinidad and Tobago 
Cyprus  Malawi  Turkey 
Czech Republic  Malaysia  United Kingdom 
Denmark Mauritius Uruguay 
Dominican Republic  Mexico  USA 
Finland Netherlands  Venezuela 
France New  Zealand  Zambia 
Germany Norway   
Greece Poland  
Note: countries in italics have only one period of being categorized as fully democratic. 
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